Erich Fromm and Conservation Science

To be successful conservation must alter the actions of individuals.  To alter the actions of individuals it is helpful to first understand human nature.  This is the realm of philosophy and psychoanalysis, of ideas resulting from slow and deep thinking not necessarily tested through experiments.  Instead of writing about what conservation can learn from other sciences, today I will write about what conservation can learn from the social sciences, particularly from Erich Fromm.

Eric Fromm (1900-1980) was a psychoanalyst (the Freudian school of psychology) and a social psychologist.  His ideas were not the results of experiments and consequent adjustments.  He worked up from the principles he believed to govern human behaviour, principles from philosophy, psychoanalysis and his own experiences and observations.  In ‘To have or to be?’, his 1976 book, Fromm wrote that most individuals “identify themselves by the following formula: I am=what I have and what I consume” and, consequently, in a conservation between two individuals of differing opinions “Each identifies with his own opinion.  What matters to each is to find better, i.e, more reasonable, arguments to defend his position.  Neither expects to change his own opinion, or that his opponent’s opinion will change.  Each is afraid of changing his own opinion, precisely because it is one of his possessions, and hence its loss would mean an impoverishment”.

I was first reminded of this passage when reading a paper advocating that scientists should not limit themselves to one theory (to prevent them from becoming too attached), instead they should suggest as many possible theories as possible and design experiments with the aim of disproving them.  It makes intuitive sense that individuals get attached to their ideas; Fromm offers a framework for understanding this.  He suggests that people derive their value, their self-worth from the ideas they create and then consume.  To lose an idea (to scientific progress) is just like losing another possession.

Fromm’s theory also has powerful ramifications for understanding the public’s stance on and engagement with issues of science such as global warming and GM technologies.  According to Fromm, an idea’s value is not a function of the idea’s use as a tool for making sense of the world (its usefulness); instead an idea’s value is determined by the cost of disowning that idea if a new, incompatible one is adopted.  More useful (i.e. correct) ideas do not necessarily replace less useful ideas, this means the initial ideas one creates regarding a subject are self-reinforcing and therefore very important.

Recently, the Cultural Cognition Project has produced quantitative evidence to support Fromm’s theory (I’m not sure if they were aware of Fromm’s work or not).  Their research showed citizens presented with expert sources regarding climate change were more likely to judge the expert source to be “knowledgeable and trustworthy” when the expert’s view agreed with their own.  Another study (by the same research group) reports that “Members of the public with the highest degrees of science literacy and technical reasoning capacity were not the most concerned about climate change” (authors’ italics).  The polarised opinions of two groups, separated on the basis of their political values, diverged as scientific literacy and technical reasoning increased, exactly as Fromm’s theory (“what matters to each is to find better, i.e, more reasonable , arguments to defend his position”) predicts.  

Andrew Balmford showed that children are better at identifying pokemon than real species (see here), might this be partly due to an ability to take ownership of pokemon (via card and computer games) which does not exist for real species (other than pets)?  How could this ownership be best replicated for real species?

Fromm suggests that keeping an open mind and avoiding dogmatism is difficult and requires active effort.  I suggest that it is the scientist’s role to purposefully keep an open and unbiased mind whilst they practice science, in their personal life, as with the rest of the public, they are free to respond to evidence however they like.

Conservation, a subject or a method?

A few months ago I sat down with the aim of describing exactly what conservation science is with the hope of producing a sort of framework.  I struggled.  I struggled because, trying to describe a science, I attempted to outline the conservation science method.  Pathology has a method and economics has a method; conservation science (if it can be called a science) does not have a method.  This is because conservation is a subject in the same way that, for example, asking how a healthcare system could be improved would be a subject.  To improve a healthcare system one would need not only look at biomedical research but also how to engineer the best buildings, how to attract and train the best staff, how to alter the public’s behaviour (in an acceptable manner) such that the demands on the system were reduced and how to best use the available staff, buildings and other resources.  In this blog I will explore the different strands of research which could and do contribute to the field of conservation highlighting that, in such a complex subject, explicitly defining the question one is answering and the framework they are using is vitally important.

I completed my undergraduate studies at Cambridge where, without really realising the significance at the time, I was introduced to three academics using and investigating different, complementary conservation methods. Head of conservation research for the RSPB, Rhys Green lectured me on a problem solving, investigative method used to isolate the factor causing the decline of vultures in Asia.  This was the similar approach to my idea of science, based on lab science.  William Sutherland introduced me to horizon scanning, a method to identify the upcoming challenges for conservation in conjunction with policy makers.  This type of research is obviously well complemented by the problem solving approach Rhys Green expounded.  William Sutherland also introduced me to citizen science, a framework for harnessing the information generated, often without being captured, by conservation practitioners.  This framework also has the potential to complements the Rhys Green framework, generating the data necessary to find solutions. 

Andrew Balmford, in my opinion a person who excels at providing the framework in which problems are best considered also lectured me.  Above all else, his lectures highlighted to me the need to identify the correct currency with which to measure the success of conservation efforts and the inevitable trade-offs entailed.  If you want to know how successful a zoo in then you must define success, is it visitor numbers or changes in individuals’ attitudes towards nature or the number of successful reintroductions or profits?  Are zoos trying to maximise the same measure of success as conservation scientists?  This approach largely influenced my blog on Quality Adjusted Life Years (QUALYs), the metric used by the NHS to quantify the value of different treatments.  It is also largely through the work of Andrew Balmford that I was introduced to the ecosystem services approach, an attempt to find a common currency which will allow conservation to engage with economics and politics, the forces which, ultimately, shape human behaviour and therefore the fate of nature (again, my blog on QUALYs examines this issue).

This last year, since graduating, I have discovered two new methods which, I believe, have much to offer to conservation.  The first is behavioural economics.  I have stated that economics and politics shape human behaviour but economics does not provide a perfect prediction of human behaviour.  Understanding why individuals act ‘non-rationally’ (not as an economic model would predict) is the realm of behavioural economics.  I believe that it will prove to be extremely valuable by aiding our understanding of the decision making of individuals, such as farmers, whose actions determine the fate of nature.  Once these decision making processes are understood, policy makers will be able to offer farmers, and other stewards of nature, the rewards they will respond to in exchange for actions which benefit nature (identified via traditional research and Sutherland’s citizen science).  Here is a link to a blog I wrote on what behavioural economics can offer conservation.  The second is no so much a method as a way of thinking (at least to me, perhaps I am not intelligent enough to convert this new awareness into a method).  It comes from the books of Nicholas Nassim Taleb, ‘Fooled by Randomness’ and ‘The Black Swan’.  These books provide a way of thinking about randomness in complex systems, and, ultimately conclude that it is better to be broadly right when making ecological predictions and designing conservation interventions than attempting to make precise predictions and being wrong.  If policy makers can be convinced that they are better served by uncertain predictions which include a measure of the uncertainty entailed, then the conservation would, I believe, benefit.  I have also written this blog on this subject.

Though I have characterised the three Cambridge professors as each pursuing different methods, in reality they co-operate and their work overlaps greatly.  In such an interdisciplinary field, collaboration within and between departments offers so much.  I think I will return to my blog and try to bring these strands and methods together into some sort of framework.  If you have any comments or advice then please do leave your thoughts below.  Many thanks.