This blog will focus on one particular problem of viewing
the ecosystem services valuation (E.S.) approach as a conservation panacea and
possible solutions to this problem. Whilst
the E.S. approach, which aims to express the value of nature to humans in
monetary terms, has the possibility to increase the price we currently put on
nature, this price will not always be sufficient. Sometimes the economic benefits arising from degrading
the environment will outweigh the economically explicit costs. In such instances the degradation of the natural
environment will be explicitly rationalised (as supposed to implicitly rationalised
as is currently the case). When this
occurs scientists can ensure that their valuation explicitly includes known
unknowns, the value of nature not yet quantified but expected to be
important. If this is not enough then
there are two broad options: conservationists can fall back on the moral
arguments which have been largely unsuccessful for the past hundred years: each
species unique, irreplaceable and should be protected for its intrinsic value
or they can hold up their handsand state that they cannot currently justify
safeguarding the relevant natural resource on the basis of the economic
costs. Recently the ‘The
State of Natural Capital Report’ opted for the first option, but I will
argue that the explicit valuation of nature requires one to forego the moral
argument. Even so, I believe intelligent
utilisation of the ecosystem services approach will do more harm than good.
Firstly, to get a few points out of the way. Nature has always had a price-tag, this price
tag has been an implicit one. As long as
people have been able to buy land or pollute their surroundings, nature has had
a price. As long as conservation has had
a finite budget which has necessitated trade offs between different
conservation actions, nature has had a price.
This price tag has rarely, if ever, reflected the value of nature to
humans. The ecosystem services valuation
approach aims to make the value of nature explicit in a currency (money) which
allows trade-offs to be made between alternative options, e.g. organic and
intensive farming. Lastly, some
ecosystem services are easier to value than others. Those which can be sold (e.g. the ability to
produce crops) have been well valued, some such as the value of increased water
quality are now being more accurately priced and others, such as the value of
the emotional wellbeing gained from being in a natural environment are much
harder to value. The ecosystem services
approach does not have to ensure that the price we put on nature perfectly
reflects the nature’s value to us to be effective, it only has to ensure that
the price we put on nature is more accurate
and that this increased accuracy is enough to alter decisions.
The short term aim of the ecosystem services approach is not
to perfectly measure the value of nature to us, it is to identify the biggest
and easiest to measures sources of value such as pollination services, carbon
storage and water quality enhancement.
Often including these values will be enough to alter decisions but
sometimes it won’t. When, in light of
this valuation, environmental degradation is still economically rational then
it is important that the existence of known unknowns, such as the cultural value
or any other unmeasured value are acknowledged.
In some circumstances, where the benefits narrowly outweigh the
quantified costs, this may result in decision makers erring on the side of
caution. Even if this is not the case,
making the known unknowns explicit is a useful tool for directing future
research. This approach would also
incentivise conservationists to create accounting methods which allow new
information to be incorporated, methods which are transparent and useful to
policy makers.
When an ecosystem services argument, which makes the known
unknowns explicit is insufficient, should conservationists throw down the
ecosystem services tool and redouble their efforts to prevent this extinction
by reverting to the moral argument? ‘The
State of Natural Capital’ chose this option writing ‘when thinking about natural capital, wild species and habitats require
special treatment that reflects their irreplaceability’ (authors’
emphasis). It is my opinion that a change
of tack of this manner would undermine the ecosystem services (E.S.)
approach. I believe that the use of the E.S.
approach is a recognition, by conservationists, that in order to contribute to
decisions they must be perceived as a consistent, reliable and impartial contributor
to decisions. In resorting to the moral
argument, one chooses a personal rather than impartial valuation of nature. Who would want to engage with a conservation
organisation/scientist knowing that the conservationist, upon losing an
argument, would react in this way?
If conservation needs to have a constant presence at the
decision making table but the moral argument still has some value then the
opportunity exists to split the use of economic and moral arguments between
different individuals/organisations.
Undoubtedly academics are not the most effective at rallying large scale
public opposition to environmentally degrading activities. Instead of individuals leaving the table to
pick up their placards when an argument based upon ecosystem services valuation
is insufficient, they could stay at the table whilst those organisations and
individuals best at rallying public opinion take on the moral argument.
The ecosystem services approach is not perfect and most of
those who champion it became involved in conservation for moral reasons. Conservation must not lose sight of these
reasons which drive some of their number to the decision making table. I am a fan of the ecosystem services approach
and I believe that one who fights for nature with the ecosystem services sword
must be willing to see nature die by this sword. Ultimately, conservation needs collaboration,
whatever tools conservationists use, they must not lose sight of their ultimate
motivation and aims.
